DoD - Operation Dust Devil: Dureshi National Armed Forces Capability Assessment

[1LT J. N. Lee]

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC

16 JULY 2025

(S) Operation Dust Devil: Dureshi National Armed Forces Capability Assessment


(U) Administrative

All acronyms utilized in the following brief are proactively defined and utilized strictly for the streamlining of text and characters. All acronyms in the following report are defined/transcribed in full upon initial use and then abbreviated for subsequent use. The "Spoilers" marked part below contains utilized acronyms/abbreviations and their definitions and is closed simply to condense report size.

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U - Unclassified. Used for government documents that do not merit a particular classification or which have been declassified. The information is low-impact, and therefore does not require any special protection, such as vetting of personnel.

CUI - Controlled Unclassified Information: Previously used as the "For Offical Use Only/FOUO" caveat for classifying unclassified, but internally distributed information, intended for controlled release to authorized persons only, but not sensitive enough to warrant SECRET marking & handling procedures.

S - Secret. Material that would cause serious damage to national security if it were publicly available.

DNAF - Dureshi National Armed Forces

IRD - Islamist Republic of Duresh

DNN - Dureshi National Navy

DNAFI - Dureshi National Air Force of Islam

DNISFC - Dureshi National Islamic Special Forces Command

DCDC - Dureshi Cyber Defense Corps

(S) Introduction

(S) The purpose of this document is to familiarize US forces deployed within the Anizay Theater of Operations (ATO) with the Islamist Republic of Duresh (IRD), and the capabilities and equipment in use by their military, the Dureshi National Armed Forces (DNAF).

(S) Overview

Fig. 1: Geographic Map of the IRD relative to Iraq and Iran

(CUI) The IRD is a sovereign nation in the Middle East, bordering Iraq to the West, the Caspian Sea to the North, and sharing frontiers with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. A regional power with a complex political and religious structure, Duresh is widely regarded as a revisionist state that seeks to expand its influence across the Muslim world, particularly through support of ideological proxies.

(CUI) Government:

• Type: Theocratic Republic
• Supreme Leader: Ayatollah Kaveh Farzaneh
• President: Dr. Reza Bahrami
• Legislature: Majlis-e-Duresh (unicameral, 280 seats)
• Judiciary: Supreme Council of Islamic Jurisprudence
• Capital: Tabriz

(CUI) The Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority over state policy, particularly in matters of defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs. The elected president handles day-to-day governance, though all candidates must be vetted by the Council of Guardians.

(CUI) Geography:

• Area: 291,4662 km²
• Terrain: Predominantly mountainous and arid, with fertile coastal plains along the Dureshi Gulf
• Climate: Semi-arid to arid; mountainous regions experience cold winters

(CUI) Population:

• Estimated Population (2021): 27 million
• Ethnic Groups: Persian (65%), Azeri (20%), Kurds (7%), Baluchi (4%), Arab (2%), Others (2%)
• Religion:
• Shia Islam (Official, 92%)
• Sunni Islam (5%)
• Other (3%)
• Official Language: Dureshi Persian
• Major Cities: Tabriz, Qumara, Darvazeh, Armanabad

(CUI) Economy:

• GDP (nominal): $280 billion USD
• Major Industries: Petroleum, natural gas, military manufacturing, agriculture, textile, jewelry, petrochemicals, cyber warfare technology
• Currency: Dureshi Rial (DRL)
• Exports: Crude oil, natural gas, weapons systems, phosphates, saffron
• Key Trading Partners: China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Venezuela, North Korea (informal)

(CUI) The economy is heavily reliant on fossil fuel exports and state-run industries. Sanctions from Western countries have pushed Duresh toward a more self-sufficient, East-aligned trade network. Iranian and Turkish interests strongly influence both the industry and the economy of the country.

(CUI) Foreign Policy:

• Duresh pursues a doctrine of “Strategic Sovereignty,” aiming to challenge Western-aligned influence in the Middle East through soft power, ideological outreach, and indirect military intervention. It backs aligned insurgent groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and maintains close ties to factions with Shia or pan-Islamist objectives.
• The government has recently launched Operation “Burning Palm,” a military deployment to western Iraq under the pretense of “securing regional stability and disarming illegal chemical weapons.” This has drawn sharp criticism from NATO and the United Nations, who view it as a thinly veiled attempt to expand Duresh’s regional hegemony.

(CUI) IRD strategic doctrine of “Strategic Depth and Regional Guardianship” positions Duresh as the spiritual and security guarantor of Shi’a populations across the Middle East, especially in failed or fragile Sunni-majority states. Duresh claims its actions are defensive and preemptive, often citing protection of holy sites, humanitarian intervention, or counterterrorism as justification for regional operations.

(CUI) Declared Objectives:

• Protect Shi’a minorities and shrines from what it frames as “takfiri” and “foreign-backed” Sunni extremists.
• Prevent Western-backed regime change efforts in neighboring states.
• Maintain influence in Iraq and Syria to create a contiguous “Axis of Resistance” from Duresh to the Mediterranean.
• Counterbalance NATO and UN military presence in the region, which it views as a neocolonial encroachment.

(CUI) Rationale for Intervention in Iraq:

• WMD Disarmament Narrative: Duresh claims that recent ISR leaks and “neutral” regional intelligence have revealed a covert U.S.-Iraqi chemical weapons program based out of Anizay oil infrastructure. This false narrative provides the pretext for Duresh’s declared mission: to “safeguard regional stability” by leading an international disarmament coalition.
• Support for Sovereignty: Duresh claims Iraq’s sovereignty is being undermined by the continued presence of NATO and UN troops, which it paints as occupation under another name. This aligns with their long-running propaganda line accusing the West of imperial overreach.
• Combatting Extremism (Selective): Duresh justifies intervention as a counter-terror mission, particularly against factions like the Al-Fulisan Brigade and Lions of the Tigris, whose tribal-nationalist leanings oppose Duresh’s ideological vision. Meanwhile, it clandestinely supports others (e.g., Swords of Tarhid and certain GoJ cells) that align with its objectives.

(S) Methods of Influence:

• Proxy Support: Duresh provides arms, training, and command oversight to partner insurgents through the Dureshi National Islamic Special Forces Command. These actors operate in Anizay, especially near oil facilities and border towns.
• Disinformation Campaigns: Dureshi news networks and social media actors spread narratives about Western war crimes, civilian casualties from NATO drone strikes, and corruption within the Iraqi government.
• Hybrid Warfare: Duresh deploys cyber operations, cultural diplomacy, and humanitarian missions (fronts for QRF staging areas) to build soft power and disrupt Coalition command structures.

(CUI) Military:

• Dureshi National Ground Forces (DNGF):
• Main conventional land army utilizing Soviet-era equipment and assets, with some modern Russian and captured NATO wheeled APCs/IFVs mixed in.
• Manpower: ~200,000.
• Dureshi National Navy (DNN):
• Operates mainly in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. Maintains larger surface combatants, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft.
• Manpower: ~50,000.
• Dureshi National Air Force of Islam (DNAFI):
• Operates aging U.S. and Soviet-era aircrafts (F-4, F-5, F-14, MiG-29, Su-24) supplemented by domestically modified versions and drones.
• Manpower: ~37,000.
• Dureshi National Islamic Special Forces Command (DNISFC):
• Elite external operations unit; responsible for overseas missions and training proxy groups such as the Lions of the Tigris.
• Manpower: ~2,700.
• Dureshi Cyber Defense Corps (DCDC):
• Main offensive cyber unit, responsible for espionage, sabotage, and attacks on infrastructure.
• Viewed as a force multiplier to compensate for conventional military limitations, emphasizing asymmetric warfare, deterrence, retaliation, and influence operations.
• Manpower: ~450.

(S) DNAF tactical doctrine emphasizes a strong offense above all, supported by heavy armor, mechanized infantry, and constant long/medium-range artillery barrages. While poorly equipped compared to their NATO counterparts, DNAF soldiers are very strongly ideologically aligned with the version of the Islamic faith led by the IRD's supreme leader, and are known to have near-fanatical morale. While their air force is even more lacking, their nuclear capability is more than a credible threat and deterrent against any would-be adversary. The DNAF, and the IRD at large, is considered a near-peer threat.

(S) Dureshi National Ground Forces

Fig. 2: DNGF infantry next to a BTR-70 wreck

(S) As the main invading force into Iraq and the tip of the spear, the DNGF will be the largest threat against coalition troops currently deployed to the threatre of operations. While only the two most mobile and ready divisions have crossed the border thus far, it is only a matter of time before further follow-on forces also successfully cross the border, despite continuous Air Force and Navy strategic strikes.

(S) Armored Divisions:

• 9th Armored Division:
• The most well-trained and well-equipped armored division within the DNGF.
• Led the invasion into Iraq and is currently operating within the theatre of operations.
• 16th Armored Division:
• Positioned near the Iraqi border and protects Dureshi sovereignty.
• Will likely deploy as reinforcements for the 9th Armored Division.
• 92nd Armored Division:
• DNGF's reserve armored division, positioned along less-critical borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
• Will likely maintain their current defensive posture.
• Equipment Overview:
• The DNGF Armored Divisions operate a wide variety of Soviet tanks due to decades of sanctions and limited procurement.
• Assets: T-72A, T-72A obr. 1981, T-72A obr. 1983, T-72AV, T-72B, T-72BM, T-72BA, T-72B3.

(S) Mechanized Divisions:

• 3rd Mechanized Division:
• One of the largest formations within the Dureshi military, with garrisons along the Iraqi border.
• Led the invasion into Iraq and is currently operating within the theatre of operations.
• 21st Mechanized Infantry Division:
• Garrisoned near the capital, part of Tabriz's reserve.
• Tasked with defense of the capital and as rapid deployment in emergencies.
• Will likely maintain current defensive posture.
• 84th Mechanized Infantry Division:
• Garrisoned along the Iraq-Iran border to the South.
• Will likely deploy as reinforcements for the 3rd Mechanized Division.
• 88th Armored Division:
• Often reinforced with mechanized elements, effectively functioning as a hybrid armored-mechanized division.
• Will likely lead the second offensive.
• Assets: BMP-1, BMP-1P, BMP-2M, BMP-2MG, BMP-2MGL, BRDM-2,  BTR-70, BTR-90, BTR-90M, BTR-90MGL, LAV-25 (captured), VPK APCs, Urals, UAZs.

(S) Artillery Brigades:

• 11th Artillery Brigade:
• Based in Armanabad, and covers the Azerbaijan border and the Caspian Sea.
• 22nd Artillery Brigade:
• Based in Tabriz, and covers the Turkish/Armenia border.
• 33rd Artillery Brigade:
• Based in Darvazeh, and covers the Iran border.
• 44th Artillery Brigade:
• Based in Qumara, and covers the Iraq border.
• Currently supporting the invading force into Iraq, and will likely cross the border once the initial defensive lines have been breached.
• Assets: 2B14 82mm mortars, 2S1 122mm self-propelled howitzers.

(S) Militant Factions

(S) Initial reports indicate that most, if not all, militant fighters were unaware of the Dureshi invasion until DNGF troops have crossed the border. The only exception is the leadership of the Lions of the Tigris, who have entirely been replaced with DNISFC operatives after a violent altercation with the previous leadership the night before the invasion took place. Confirmation of the event came a few hours after the invasion, when the new leadership of the Lions announced that the militant group would be standing aside for the "true freedom fighters" thanks to a "peaceful transfer of power the night previous".

(S) Front line coalition troops have reported fighting between DNGF troops and unidentifiable militant fighters along the border, who likely belong to militant cells of the remaining militant factions still present in Anizay, including the Al-Fulisan Brigade and Swords of Tarhid. These militant factions have also likely been infiltrated by DNISFC operatives, though orders to stand down seem to have not made their way down to the bottom of the chain or been ignored entirely by these cells. In either case, these militants were seen firing indiscriminately upon both BLUFOR and OPFOR alike, but were quickly dispatched after they were enveloped on both sides by BLUFOR and OPFOR respectively.

(S) Until positive contact can be made with these disconnected cells' leaders and confirmation can be had regarding their adversarial status, all militant factions are still designated as OPFOR. However, coalition troops must remain cognizant of possible "insubordinate" militant cells, who would be more willing to defect and align themselves with INDFOR/BLUFOR against the common threat of the invading Dureshi forces.


Classified By: S-2 Operations Command
Reason: 1.4(a)
Declassify On: 20300716

END REPORT

The entirety of this document represents fictional works of the 506th Infantry Regiment Realism Unit, S-2 Intelligence Shop, developed for use within the Arma Reforger military simulation video game, and exists purely for entertainment and educational purposes only. The story, all names, characters, and incidents portrayed are fictitious. No identification with actual persons (living or deceased), places, buildings, and products is intended or should be inferred.