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INSCOM Intelligence Report 16JAN22 - NRU-SA Cooperation and EW Capabilities

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SGT N. White:
SECRET

UNITED STATES ARMY

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT BELVOIR, VA16JAN22

(S) NRU-SA Cooperation and EW Capabilities


(U) Overview

(U) The purpose of this document is to make the personnel of 1-506th IR and their attached support elements aware of new information regarding the nature of belligerent factions operating in Finland. This report is intended to supplement existing material regarding enemy force structure, disposition, and presumed intent.

(U) NRU-SA Relationship

(S) Information relevant to this section can be found in the following two INSCOMs: OOW 03-21 POW Interrogation, Analysis of OPFOR Strategy In Ruha.

(S) Members of the Nationalist Russian Union ("NRU") splinter faction and Safe Asia PMC ("SA"), which were originally thought to be separate entities entirely, have both been encountered within the Hellanmaa AO of Operation Odin's Watch. These formations, while still distinct, have been witnessed committing to assaults or other maneuvers jointly. Actions involving NRU and SA fighting together have increased in frequency to almost daily reports as of the completion of the 506th's local combat operations on 12DEC21.

(S) Commercial helmet cameras have been recovered from SA positions by friendly forces. Video and audio evidence contained within the data cards revealed mock-ups of intended targets, simulated "Americans" portrayed by SA personnel, and incomplete propaganda reels. Analysis of the 506th COPs was also referred to, but no such materials were able to be recovered within the files.

(S) The aggregate result of S2's analysis suggests that SA and NRU forces have conducted secret, joint field trainings aimed toward a common operational and political goal.

(U) Notes on Capability

(S) SA is already known to wield modern, Western equipment and exercise similar tactics. More recently, numerous examples of electronic equipment were seized from SA by friendly forces. For example, during OOW 13-21 TFA and while clearing Hööpakka, Havoc 1-2 discovered a warehouse which contained a map case, a hard drive, and a container filled with advanced electronic equipment and recordings of helmet cams belonging to the NRU and SA. Via 2LT Littleberry, S2 has inspected these objects and a great deal of information has been gleaned as a result. Amongst the recovered electronic equipment were unissued force tracker-type devices, portable server and computer units, as well as various generators to power these systems. Radio gear configured with unusual encryption codes has also been ubiquitous among hostiles, suggesting lateral real-time communication between SA and NRU forces is taking place.


Havoc 7 located an OPFOR laptop during OOW 12-21 TFC, SW of COP Cobal.

1SG L. McCoy located additional laptops during OOW 11-21 TFB.
(S) Hard drives pulled from various devices have provided a considerable trove of information, of which much is still not prepared for dissemination. For additional considerations on SA weapons deployment, see Intelligence Report on SafeAsia's Use of Guided Weapons.


Captain Drumheller located and secured NRU electronic equipment during OOW 11-21, including codes for radio equipment and transmissions.
(U) Summary

(S) Based upon the above data points, it is S-2's opinion that Safe Asia is openly integrating with NRU in an advisory and force multiplication capacity. Therefore, the NRU, though capable of deploying vast infantry formations and bringing tremendous firepower to bear, are likely directing the deployment and targeting of SA forces. Further analysis of their intent will be forthcoming.


Classified By: S-2 Intelligence
Reason: 1.4(a)
Declassify On: (2037)(01)(17)

END REPORT

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