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INSCOM Intelligence Report 17OCT21 - Analysis of OPFOR Strategy In Ruha

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SSG N. White:
SECRET

UNITED STATES ARMY

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT BELVOIR, VA17 OCT 2021

Synopsis of the Nationalist Russian Union Strategy in Ruha


Executive Overview

(U) The purpose of this document is to speculate on the intent of the Nationalist Russian Union (NRU) in the vicinity of Ruha, Finland. S-2 has accordingly prepared this assessment for the benefit of 1-506th personnel and attached elements.

Geographic and Tactical Observations

(U) Ruha and its surrounding terrain is low in elevation and mostly flat, moreso than other AOs that the NRU currently operate in such as Virolhati and Oviaukko Island. Open farmland and sprawling forests dominate the topography -- conversely, very little urbanization is present.

(S) Of greater import is the fact that Ruha is split north-to-south by three major arteries that the NRU are dependent upon for logistical resupply: a wide highway, twin rail lines, and a sizable river, all of which run their course no more than three or four kilometers from each other at their furthest separation. These routes are critical for the NRU to continue their delaying withdrawal to the north.

(S) While Ruha is mostly woodland, the three logistical supply lines through Ruha are without notable terrain disturbances. Friendly troops seeking to secure these lanes will be exposed to crew-served and vehicle-borne weapon systems with far lines of sight, which is tactically advantageous to their large bore weaponry such as their array of fielded BMPs and MBTs. Additionally, NRU forces have assembled roadblocks and entrenchments along these routes to maximize the difficulty in seizing them.

(S) Soviet-era doctrine, which all NRU officers will have been familiarized with, relied heavily upon armored assets and indirect-fire weapons. Flat, open areas such as those prevalent in Ruha will further augment these types of force multipliers, while simultaneously producing navigational and tactical problems for friendly forces in return.



Pictured above: Undated photograph of T-72 tanks being transported by rail line in the vicinity of Ruha, Finland.
Strategic Observations

(S) The NRU are increasingly logistically-strained and struggling for an opening to engage friendly forces in AOs closer to the Russian border pocket since the 506th's successful assault of Virolahti. S-2 has determined this to be a major factor in current positioning of the NRU, as Ruha is only 146 kilometers to the north-west of Virolahti. Should the 506th and allied forces be able to decisively engage and hold Ruha, the NRU would have no other choice to either (1) withdraw closer to the Russian border by pushing north into the Finnish countryside or (2) risk decisive encirclement by allied forces near and around the countryside of Hellanmaa, to the north of Helinski.

Conclusion

(S) S-2 believes there are two main goals to NRU's presence in Ruha. The first is to alleviate pressure on other fronts to the NRU's north and west, where the NRU are attempting to secure a foothold to the north of Helinksi. By forcing NATO forces to first clear through Ruha, the NRU may be able to delay allied forces long enough to push into and secure Helinski. The second is to provide a logistical lifeline for armored assets within the remaining NRU inventory. If the 506th are able to sever the NRU's supply routes, forces in the region will be denied their strongest capabilities, and any potential thrust deeper towards Helinski and rural Finland will be shuttered.


Classified By: S-2 Intelligence
Reason: 1.4(a)
Declassify On: (2031)(10)(18)

END REPORT

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